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by
Social networks play a vital role in rural China. Households are not isolated;
they are connected via a network through various cooperative, sharing, and
gift exchange behaviors. In the absence of well-functioning formal institu-
tions, such social networks often serve as the informal contracts. This paper
develops a model of risk sharing in the wake of an earthquake, and examined
the determinants of the self-enforcing conditions. Based on the theoretical
result, we further provide empirical evidence of the labor sharing behavior
of 1420 rural household before and after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. We
found that the households exposed to higher intensity of earthquakes signif-
icantly reduced their effort in investing in and maintaining the labor sharing
network. We further examined gift-exchange, another important social inter-
actions that links various households in rural China as a robustness check.
We found that people significantly reduce their gift giving behavior in the
aftermath of the disaster: one degree increase in earthquake intensity is as-
sociated a reduction in gift frequency for one 0.85 to 1 times per year in 2009,
and 0.26-0.41 times per year in 2011, respectively. The potential channel is
that the unexpected natural disaster introduced a shift in time discount fac-
tor, and people were "living like there’s no tomorrow" (Filipski et al., 2015),
reduced the reliance on informal social networks, and cut down social in-
vestment for the future. While other channels proposed in the model, such
as income, income correlation coefficient, risk aversion rate, and network size
are not significant.
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1Chapter 1
Background
1.1 Introduction
Social networks have been gaining growing popularity in the economic
literature during the past decade. This question is of essential importance in
the developing world, since social networks often serve as the informal con-
tracts in the absence of well-functioning formal institutions (Chandrasekhar,
Kinnan, and Larreguy, 2014). Social interactions among agents play an im-
portant role in various domains of the peasants’ daily lives, from production
to credit. For example, shared labor in farmwork helps to reduce the contrac-
tual cost in hiring an extrafamily labor; gift-exchange mechanism and non-
interest loans are substitutes for the formal credit market; word-of-month
information and friends’ reference enables non-farm job searching (Munshi
and Rosenzweig, 2015; Montgomery, 1991). Understanding how social in-
teractions work in the developing world has great policy implications for
improving the welfare of the poor.
One of the most fundamental functions for social networks in rural areas
is risk sharing, which has been explored intensively for decades in the field of
development economics ( Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997, Fafchamps
and Lund, 2003, Bloch, Genicot, and Ray, 2008,Takasaki et al., 2011). The
informal network of mutual insurance that is enforced by social pressure
ties individuals together when a disaster occurs (Douty, 1972). Examples
of the village level, mutual support includes gift giving, work-sharing ar-
rangements, reciprocal interest-free credit, shared meals, communal access
to land, and sharing bullocks (Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997; Scott,
1976). Gifts and free interest loans from a close network of friends and rel-
atives help to smooth consumption in the face of idiosyncratic risk (Bloch,
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Genicot, and Ray, 2008; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003). Labor-sharing arrange-
ments, which are determined mainly by network endowment, could help
the poor farmers find extrafamily labor that is rare due to constraints on la-
bor liquidity ( Gilligan, 2004; Takasaki et al., 2011), and it helps to reduce the
adverse effects of idiosyncratic production shocks (Dercon, Hoddinott, and
Woldehanna, 2005).
One central question is: is the risk sharing network self-enforcing? To
our knowledge, whether the social network as an informal risk-sharing con-
tract is self-enforcing and the determinants of self-enforcing condition before
and after a shock still remains to be explored. This paper will answer this
question and fill this research gap both theoretically and empirically. We will
firstly present a theoretical framework to analyze how networks operate in
the aftermath of a disaster. We also provide empirical evidence using a three-
year panel data collected in rural Sichuan, China from both before and after
the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. The econometric results indicated that people
were less willing to invest in and maintain the social network if they suffered
heavily from the earthquake.
Another gap in the network literature in the developing societies is the
availability of high quality network data. Different from data retrieved from
on-line sources (Facebook data, etc), the information of social links is costly
to obtain through household surveys and is often inaccurate. Ideally, re-
searchers survey each individual to identify all the network nodes, and cap-
ture the lists of each respondent’s connection (Bramoullé, Galeotti, and Rogers,
2016). But this brings two potential problems: (1) if the questions are cum-
bersome to answer (recall the relationship with each of the other households
in the survey) , it is easy to lose respondents (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007) or
get partial answers, (2) sometimes the questions are relatively easier (i.e. "to
recall the person you turn to when in trouble" (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003),
"to name some friends in the network" (Elliott and Golub, 2013)), but the sub-
jective answers of social links are discordant (individual i cites j but j doesn’t
cite i). These issues will bring further identification problem (Comola and
Fafchamps, 2014).
A pioneering work is Chen (2007), in which the author collected infor-
mation on pairwise connections of gifts exchange from the gift-record books
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of 335 rural households in Guizhou, China, along with information on kin-
ship and relatedness to match each of the 9820 potential gift-link. Another
network dataset is jointly collected by Bharatha Swamukti Samsthe (BBS)
and the research team of Jackson, which covers 13 types of relationships be-
tween any two individuals from 75 Indian villages 1. Studies on information
diffusion process and was conducted based on this dataset (Jacobs et al., 2013,
Banerjee et al., 2013).
Due to the feasibility and cost of field work, the adoption of economic
experiment to study social networks in the developing world has also been
gaining popularity (Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997). However, the an-
swers from hypothetical questions (such as dictator games) may not be a
good estimator for real-world behaviors (Gray, 2013). For example, the dicta-
tor game and other experiment show that people tend to share and cooperate,
even though they might not necessarily do so in the real world (Helbing and
Balietti, 2010, Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith, 1996). Therefore, to estimate
cooperative behavior using real world data would provide a more accurate
evidence, and contribute to the the existing empirical literature.
In this paper, we build a more approachable measurement for network-
ing behavior, which helps us to lessen the reliance on a perfect data. The
standard network theory suggests that there are two types of "connected-
ness" in a system, the first one is at the level of structure- the linkages among
individuals; and the second one is at the level of behavior- the implicit con-
sequences of agent’s actions on everyone else in the network (Easley and
Kleinberg, 2010). We rely on the second type of connection, and use the fre-
quency of networking behavior to describe the strength of social networks.
The frequency is a self-reported level for a certain behavior. 2 This approach
is also consistent with the recent network theory using the repeated games
to model informal insurance. Some similar approaches in previous litera-
ture include Bloch, Genicot, and Ray, 2008, where they count the number of
1See Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson (2013), and publicly available at
http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/eduflo/social
2We investigated seven network-based behaviors, including labor sharing in agricultural
production, information sharing on non-farm jobs, informal borrowing and lending, helping
in proctoring the workers in house construction, helping in taking care of the children and
elders, helping in holding a wedding ceremony, helping in holding a funeral. Those different
measures for network behavior help us to better understand the social interactions in the
aftermath in Sichuan. We choose the first one as the main behavior of intereat in this paper.
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rounds of communication as the "level".
This paper therefore contributes the literature in three ways. First, it
develops a simple model to examine the determinants of self-enforcing risk
sharing contracts among members of a network. Second, it provides empir-
ical evidence to advance our understanding about the long term impact of
natural disaster as a determinant of such self-enforcing constraints. Third, it
attempts to measure the network density based on the frequency of interac-
tions among agents using the regular household survey data.
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 1.2 provides literature re-
view on the impact of natural disasters and various determinants for social
interactions. Chapter 1.3 provides background information about the 2008
Sichuan earthquake, the earthquake intensity measurement, and describes
the dataset. Chapter 2 develops a theoretical model to analyze the risk shar-
ing arrangement and the role of natural disaster. Chapter 3 provides empir-
ical evidence of labor sharing behavior in the aftermath of a disaster that are
based on the theoretical findings. Gift-exchange as another form of social
interaction has also been examined as a robustness check.
1.2 Literature Review
Our paper contributes to the network formation in the presence of a
community shock. Network formation is of key interest to economists. Pre-
sumed that network formation and agents’ behaviors are connected, vast
theoretical literature examines the self-organizing network relations using
game-theoretic approaches, which include the existence of stable and effi-
cient networks (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996, Jackson and Nouweland, 2005,
Galeotti, Goyal, and Kamphorst, 2006), the evolution of network in a dy-
namic setting (whether it is fixed, shrinking or growing over time)(Gomes
and Jehiel, 2005, Manea and Leishman, 2011, Lee and Fong, 2013). In a more
complex dynamic setting with risk, Blume et al., 2011 and Blume et al., 2013
developed the strategic network formation in the presence of contagious risk
to capture the trade-off between the benefit of link formation and the poten-
tial contagious risk. Under this situation, the socially stable networks lies in
the points where most of the available welfare has been lost. The contagious
risk including epidemic disease, financial contagion is of interest in the real
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world; but the non-contagious risks, such as a community level natural dis-
aster, also exert tremendous impact on the society. Would a natural disaster
disturb or enhance the stability of the cooperative agreement? How do the
agents anticipate the future potential gain and the period payoffs in the af-
termath of a disaster? These issues are all of particular interest in evaluating
the performance of social networks and provide targeted policy suggestions
to improve the social welfare. To our knowledge none have analyzed the net-
work formation under common and unexpected shock, which is the focus of
this paper.
However, the primary contribution of this paper is not theoretical; rather,
it aims to provide the empirical evidence of how natural disasters impact
social networking behavior, and build a simple model to examine the self-
sustainable condition of informal networks. To achieve these goals, we will
firstly review the impact of disasters on human behavior, followed by vari-
ous determinants of network-based cooperation and sharing. Finally, we put
particular attention to risk sharing and provide a review on relevant topics.
1.2.1 A review on impact of natural disasters
Natural disasters not only cause devastating psychical damage, life losses,
and reduce the economic growth (Pelling, Özerdem, and Barakat, 2002; Rose
et al., 1997), they also impact people’s mental health and behavior in the long
run. The medical literature documented intensively on the Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD). Economic studies focus more on the behavioral and
preference changes related to PTSD. For example, natural disasters update
people’s beliefs and perceptions towards to a riskier place (Skidmore and
Toya, 2002). The increased potential risk of natural disaster may make people
more apt to cooperate (Yamamura, 2010), reduce the expected risk of physi-
cal capital, and lead to increased human capital investment as a substitution
for physical capital (Toya and Skidmore, 2007).
A number of studies have demonstrated the positive effect of social net-
works and social capital in disaster recovery process(Aldrich, 2012a; Nak-
agawa and Shaw, 2004; Aldrich, 2012b; Tse, Wei, and Wang, 2013; Yama-
mura, 2010). But the reverse direction, i.e. the impact of disaster on social
networks have been ambiguous. On the positive side, Veszteg, Funaki, and
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Tanaka, 2015 found that mutual trust increased in the aftermath of the 2011
Thohoku earthquake using a trust game; Yamamura, 2016 showed that the
1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) earthquake significantly enhanced agents’
social investment through group activity participation; Siegel, Bourque, and
Shoaf, 1999 suggested that an altruistic (social cohesion) may have arisen in
the aftermath of the 1994 Northridge earthquake in California. On the neg-
ative side, Fleming, Chong, and Bejarano, 2014 discovered that reciprocity
within community is lower one year after the 2010 Chilean earthquake, while
the trust level were not affected. The impact could also be mixed: Castillo
and Carter, 2011 found that intermediate shocks enhance social interactions,
while extreme shocks undercut cooperation. Therefore, it is crucial to un-
derstand the underlying mechanism through which the earthquake impact
social networks.
1.2.2 A review on determinants of social exchange, coopera-
tion, and sharing
Development economists have long examined the interpersonal inter-
actions among the poor. Such interpersonal behaviors include cooperation,
sharing, and exchanges, which help to form an informal contract when for-
mal institutions are weak or absent (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007, Townsend,
1994,Udry, 1994). In this section, we review the determinants of those net-
working behaviors from literature spanning development economics, game
theory, social network theory, and the behavioral economics.
Firstly, economic incentives are one major determinant in individual’s de-
cision making process. The basic assumption is that individuals are self-
interested and they can form and server links. They benefit from connec-
tions while pay a cost of maintaining it (Watts, 2003, Jackson and Wolinsky,
1996). Unequal income distribution in a network may lead to instability in so-
cial capital through rising mistrust and stress. Thus the households in lower
social ranking may have stronger incentives to participate in the social be-
haviors with "positional externalities", such as blood donation, gift giving,
etc.(Chen and Zhang, 2010) In non-repeated situations, economic incentives
are key factors (Tabellini, 2008).
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Secondly, people are forward-looking, and thus expectation towards fu-
ture influences social exchange. In every period, people take into consider-
ation the cost of forming and maintaining links against potential future re-
wards and future reciprocity in a long run or in a short run (Bala and Goyal,
2000,Coate and Ravallion, 1993). The former on, potential rewards, is cal-
culated based on time discount factor. While the latter one, reciprocity, has
been regarded as the intrinsic motivation for the enforcement of many in-
formal contracts, where people are kind to the ones who helped them, and
punish those who hurt them (Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997). A de-
fault in current period transaction may be prevented by threatening the po-
tential defaulter to be excluded from future transactions (Udry, 1994, Barr,
Dekker, and Fafchamps, 2012). In repeated situations, this reputation consid-
eration plays a more important role (Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997,
Tabellini, 2008). Due to the feature of expecting future returns, Bourdieu,
1986 points out that social connections are the product of investment strate-
gies rather than givens. It is also noticeable that individuals are not just
forward-looking, but also learn from the past. Therefore, previous interac-
tions help to form one’s social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), and
determine the cost of creating, maintaining, or terminating the relationship
with another agent(Lee and Fong, 2013).
Thirdly, besides self interest, people’s social behaviors are also influ-
enced by the environment where they share common values, and where peer
effect exists. Social norms plays an important role in forming the link. For
example, people cannot refuse a gift, or not to contribute a gift in others’
ceremony under the pressure of social norms, even if this is against their self-
interest. (Comola and Fafchamps, 2014) And social norms in the common en-
vironment significantly impact one’s sharing action in a network(Bandiera,
Barankay, and Rasul, 2010; Galeotti, Ghiglino, and Squintani, 2013; Nahapiet
and Ghoshal, 1998 ) Peer pressure shape the incentive to cooperative(Kandel
and Lazear, 1992). Individuals’ behaviors are largely influenced by the choices
of their friends and acquaintances via a social network. A worker’s produc-
tivity is significantly higher when she works with more able friends (Bandiera,
Barankay, and Rasul, 2010,Dolfsma, Eijk, and Jolink, 2009).
Fourth, social distance plays a key role. Blood ties and friendship benefit
cooperative arrangement (Kimball, 1988), and risk is more likely to be shared
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in tightly knit group(De Weerdt, 2002). Empirical evidences have shown that
socially close pairs maintain high levels of cooperation even when the en-
forcement is moved using an field experiment in 34 Indian villages (Chan-
drasekhar, Kinnan, and Larreguy, 2014); 97% of the informal loans were
between neighbours and relatives in rural Nigerian villages (Udry, 1994);
close friends and relatives are more than three times as likely to join the
same risk pooling group (Genicot et al., 2011). The Darwinist perspective
also illustrates that helping family members help to expand the gene pool
(Cartwright, 2016, Dovidio et al., 2017).
Other factors include personal risk aversion rate, trust, emotion, as well
as exogenous intervention. Farmers with high risk aversion form coopera-
tives which involves substantial sharing of output, and can provide insur-
ance at lower cost (Kimball, 1988). Trust is associated with the closeness
among friends and relatives because of intrinsic motivations, such as guilt
(Genicot et al., 2011). Holländer, 1990 conceptualized cooperative and shar-
ing behavior as emotional activity motivated by the expectation of social ap-
proval. Such approvals include sympathy (v.s. antipathy), love (v.s. hate),
gratitude (vs. resentment), joy (vs. grief), pride (vs. shame), admiration (vs.
contempt). Through social exchange the members of group form standard
behavior which is shared and confirmed by everyone. Under this situation,
even though the social exchange allocation is not Pareto-efficient, it may pro-
vide more of the collective good and thus "higher group welfare" compared
with other allocations (optimal planning allocation or hypothetically ideal
market allocation excluding approval incentives). The exogenous impact,
such as the opening of a market or government intervention for collective
goods, may also affect agents’ outside option (Lee and Fong, 2013), and exert
an negative effect on voluntary cooperation (Holländer, 1990). This determi-
nant is consistent with our hypothesis that lack of formal institution fosters
the formation of informal contract to serve functional purposes, such as the
allocation of goods and labor in the absence of a perfect market (Jackson and
Wolinsky, 1996, Fafchamps and Lund, 2003, Townsend, 1994, Udry, 1994).
In sum, the determinants for social exchange, sharing, and cooperation
could be concluded as four major aspects: self-interest motivation, social
norms and peer effects, expectation towards future, outside institutional in-
tervention. Those factors from previous theories and empirical evidences
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help us to analyze the mechanism of the changes in social networks in the
aftermath of a natural disaster.
1.3 Background and Data
1.3.1 The 2008 Sichuan Earthquake
The 2008 Sichuan earthquake, also known as the Wenchuan earthquake,
took place on May 12 with the epicenter in Sichuan province. The earth-
quake reached a magnitude of 8.0 on the Richter scale, and caused a large
amount of physical and economic damage across Sichuan province in south-
western China. Over 68,000 people were reported dead in Sichuan province,
and over 374,000 were reported injured by falling debris and building col-
lapses. It was the deadliest earthquake for more than 30 years in China. The
earthquake was also felt in nearby provinces, and as far as northern China,
such as Beijing. It was also followed by numerous aftershocks spreading the
entire region in the following years3.
A three-year reconstruction project was carried out by the central gov-
ernment, 1 trillion RMB (about US $ 146.5 billion) financial support from the
government and millions of donations from society was spent for the recov-
ery in the affected communities.
Following the immediate rescue plan, the central government announced
a three-year reconstruction plan worth 1 trillion RMB, which is approximates
the annual GDP in Sichuan Province in 2007. The funding was allocated to
rebuilding housing (29%), infrastructure (21%), enterprises (14%), and pub-
lic services (11%) (Huang, 2010). Besides the central government-oriented
aid (NGA), the non-governmental organizations aid (NNA), and the Inter-
national humanitarian aid (IHA), the Chinese government also developed an
innovative reconstruction framework, the national counterpart aid (Xu and
Lu, 2012). Under this framework, 18 most affected counties in the earthquake
in Sichuan province were supported by 18 provinces in China, and each of
these provinces was required to commit one percent of its annual GDP to
help to re-build the houses, roads, and other types of assistance.
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Sichuan_earthquake
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1.3.2 Earthquake Intensity Measurement
Previous economic studies use distance to epicenter as a popular proxy
for earthquake severity. But it might be an accurate measurement as the
intensity is also related to soil type and geographical conditions. A better
proxy for earthquake severity is instrumental intensity, which is based on a
combined regression of recorded peak acceleration (rate of change of speed
g), and peak velocity (the greatest speed, rate of movement, cm/s). But as
the shake maps are generated automatically within seconds after an earth-
quake, the acceleration and velocity values are often raw and not checked
by humans. This may intrigue measurement errors. Moreover, ground mo-
tions can vary significantly over short distances, and thus the shake maps
are rough approximates. The criticism is that "at small scales, they should be
considered unreliable" 4.
Some psychological and economic studies use self-reported earthquake
stress as indicator for the severity of earthquake. Each individual was given
a life-events inventory, and she or he answered how upsetting or aversive
the earthquake was on a 4-point Likert-type scale with the end points not at
all and extremely. But the subjective measures may induce endogeneity in
the regression.
In this paper, we use the Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) maps as the
measurement for earthquake intensity. The advantage of MMI is that quan-
tifies the observed effects of an earthquake on the Earth’s surface, humans,
objects of nature, and man-made structures on a scale (USGS). Therefore, it
is more accurate to approximate the real effect of an earthquake. An abbre-
viated description of the levels of Modified Mercalli intensity is shown in
Figure 1.1. 5
4https://escweb.wr.usgs.gov/share/shake2/haywired/about.html
5These "Instrumental Intensities" are based on a combined regression of peak accel-
eration and velocity amplitudes vs. observed intensity for eight significant California
earthquakes (1971 San Fernando, 1979 Imperial Valley, 1986 North Palm Springs, 1987
Whittier, 1989 Loma Preita, 1991 Sierra Madre, 1992 Landers, and 1994 Northridge).
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/shakemap/background.php
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FIGURE 1.1: Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) Measurement
Sources: U.S. Geological Survey. http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/shakemap/background.php
1.3.3 Data
We merged three databases of the household survey in Sichuan province
in 2007, 2009, and 2011 with about 1500 households. The pre-disaster and
post-disaster information from both earthquake and non-earthquake places
forms a unique natural experiment, which allow us to estimate the social
and economic impact of the natural disaster on local communities. The first
database is the Sichuan component of the annual rural panel administered
by the Research Center for the Rural Economy (RCRE), which is an annual
national rural panel since 1984. Our data includes 800 households in Sichuan
province from 16 villages, and four of these villages are affected by the earth-
quake. The second database is a supplementary survey administrated jointly
by the RCRE and the International Center for Agricultural and Rural Devel-
opment (ICARD), which includes several follow up questions regarding the
earthquake and farmer’s coping strategies towards the disaster. The third
database is the Sichuan Rural Household and Migration Survey (SRHMS)
administrated jointly by Shanghai University of Finance and Economics and
ICARD. It includes about 700 households from 6 villages in Mianzhu County
starting from 2007, one year before the earthquake, and repeated in 2009 and
2011. Mianzhu County became one the most severe affected counties in the
2008 earthquake. The SRHMS and the RCRE database have enough com-
mon questions that allow us to combine them together. By merging the three
databases we construct a unique database of around 1500 sample spanning
Sichuan province, including a prior disaster baseline (See Table 1 for sum-
mary statistics used in this study).
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Figure 1.2 presents the epicenter and magnitude of the earthquake, as
well as the locations of our sample villages. We use GIS software to match
each village with MMI map from the USGS website. 6 The layered color
corresponds to the MMI table in Figure 1.1, where red color is the most severe
earthquake, followed by yellow and green. The dots represent the sample
villages, they are spanning over Sichuan province. The big pentagram is the
epicenter, and the smaller pentagrams are the aftershocks.
6Available at http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/shakemap/ as of June 2015.
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FIGURE 1.2: The Map of the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake Intensity
-Epicenter, aftershocks, and sample villages
Sources: Datasets from annual rural panel administered by Chinese Ministry of
Agriculture’s Research Center for the Rural Economy (2007, 2009, 2010) and Sichuan Rural
Household and Migration Survey, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, and the
International Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (2007, 2009, 2010).
U.S. Geological Survey.
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/shakemap/background.php
1.3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied natural disaster as a determinant of self-
enforceability conditions. While there is a vast economic literature in social
networks spanning game theory, development economics, and behavioral
economics, this paper focus on the role of natural disaster in the stability of
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the informal risk sharing network. In addition, we summarized the impact
of natural disaster, particularly the impact on social interactions and coop-
erative behaviors to build the link between natural disaster and social ex-
changes. The empirical results of whether natural disaster promote or harm
social interactions is mixed, while the theoretical framework has not been
developed in previous literature. We also reviewed the determinants of so-
cial exchange, cooperation and sharing and concluded four major aspects
from previous literature, they are: self-interested motivation, social norms
and peer effects, expectation towards future, and outside institutional inter-
vention. Followed by the literature review, we turn to the disaster explored
in this paper, the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. We introduced the background
information of this earthquake, and described how we collected the three-
wave household dataset from both before and after the Sichuan earthquake.
The MMI measurement of earthquake intensity is also introduced and visu-
alized by a map together with our sample villages. In the next chapters, we
will incorporate our findings in the theoretical model as well as in the empir-
ical estimation.
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Chapter 2
Model Specification
2.1 A Model on Risk Sharing in the Wake of a Dis-
aster
In this section, we develop a theoretical model that allows us to evalu-
ate the determinants of social transfers before and after a shock in a small
network setting. We consider an infinite horizon, dynamic, discrete game
setting. The features that we incorporate into the model include household
income, income correlation among all households, household risk aversion
rate, time discount factor, and network size. We aim to explore the self-
enforcing condition of the risk sharing arrangement (risk sharing network).
We consider discrete time with t = 0, 1, 2, ... A collection of households
i = 1, ..., N makes up a friendship/kinship network. N is the network size,
and it is different from the concept "network". 1 The income of each house-
hold i in the network at each time period is a random variable yi. We assume
that there is no auto-correlation for household income, i.e. the current income
is not correlated with past income, and each yi is identically distributed with
mean y¯ and variance σ2. Since members of the network reside in proximate
locations, their income realizations are not necessarily independent. Let ρ be
the correlation coefficient of the income level for any two households in the
network. For simplicity, we furthermore assume that yi has a two-point sup-
port yi = {y−, y+} where y+ > y−, representing periods of good and bad
1While network is a broad concept in economic theory and other fields (computer science
algorithm, etc), we refer to two different concept in our paper. The first one is risk shar-
ing network, which is an informal arrangement in rural China. The second one is network
size, which refers to the number of households one can connect to and is regarded as the
household characteristic in this paper.
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harvest, for example.
The risk preferences of each household can be represented by a von-
Neumann Morgenstern utility function U(yi), which takes the form:
U(yi) = yi − r2y
2
i (2.1)
where r denotes the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
Member households within the network participate in risk sharing. They
do so by solving a linear programming problem akin to Townsend (1994),
which seeks the Pareto Optimal income allocations such that the weighted
average of the household utilities is maximized.
The Baseline Expected Utility
The expected utility of any single household in the absence risk sharing
as EU0 is a function of the mean and variance of the household’s random
income.
EU0 = EU(yi) = E(yi − r2y
2
i ) = y¯−
r
2
(σ2 + y¯2) (2.2)
Pareto Optimal Income Sharing
At each time period, there can be n = 0, 1, ..., N number of households
who face negative income shocks, with yi = y−. Let p(n) denote the proba-
bility that n number of households experience negative income shocks. For
any given n ≤ N − 1, the network of N households can solve a maximizing
problem wherein the N households transfer income from the collective pool
∑ni yi to an individual household i in order to maximize the total utility of the
network:
max
si
W(n) =
N
∑
i
U(yi + si) (2.3)
subject to
N
∑
1
si = 0
∑ yi = ny− + (N − n)y+ (2.4)
2.1. A Model on Risk Sharing in the Wake of a Disaster 17
The Lagrangian is given by
L =
N
∑
i
U(yi + si)− λ
N
∑
1
si (2.5)
The first order conditions are:
∂W(n)
∂si
= 1− r(yi + si)− λ = 0 ∀i
The Pareto optimal transfers si depending on the income revelation of house-
hold i as a function of n are therefore given by
s+i (y
+, n) =
ny− + (N − n)y+
N
− y+ (2.6)
s−i (y
−, n) = ny
− + (N − n)y+
N
− y− (2.7)
s(yi, n) =
ny− + (N − n)y+
N
− yi (2.8)
The income inclusive of transfers yi + s(yi, n) is
ny−+(N−n)y+
N . Thus the ex-
pected utility of a household in the presence of first best risk sharing is
EUN = E(
∑Ni=1 yi
N
− r
2
(
∑Ni=1 yi
N
)2)
= y¯− r
2
(
σ2
N
+
N − 1
N
ρσ2 + y¯2) (2.9)
Interpretation of first best
The Pareto optimal transfer for each household s(yi, n) is given in (2.7),
which equals to the difference between the village level mean income y¯ and
individual i’s income yi. The mean income y¯ thus is positively correlated
with optimal transfer, while the income variance σ2, income correlation ρ
have no impact on the level of optimal transfer. The network size N is posi-
tively related to the optimal transfer. In the first best situation, the individual
household income will finally be equalized after the transferring. As a result,
the households receiving good income faced a temptation to renege such risk
sharing agreement in the absence of an external enforcement.
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The welfare gains from risk sharing is:
EUN − EUO = r(N − 1)(1− ρ)σ
2
2N
(2.10)
which is positively correlated with income variance σ2. The economic im-
plication is that agents facing with larger income uncertainty would bene-
fit more from the risk sharing arrangement. The income correlation coef-
ficient ρ between each household pair is negatively correlated with the wel-
fare gains, which indicates that households with uncommon income patterns
have greater gains from forming a risk sharing network. The network size N
contributes to welfare gains, which means that the effect is larger is more
people participate in the sharing arrangement.
Now let the probability of all N household experience negative income
shock be p¯ at every period, the discounted expected utility EVN of a risk
sharing network is given by:
EVN =
∞
∑
t=0
N
∑
i=1
(
1
1+ R
)tU(yi + si)
=
∞
∑
t=0
(
1
1+ R
)tN
{
y¯− r
2
(
σ2
N
+
N − 1
N
ρσ2 + y¯2)
}
= (1+
1
R
)N
{
y¯− r
2
(
σ2
N
+
N − 1
N
ρσ2 + y¯2)
}
(2.11)
2.1.1 Incentive Compatibility
Now let’s consider the self-enforceability of the risk sharing arrange-
ment. In the current period, the households with negative income shocks
would always choose to participate in the risk sharing arrangement and re-
ceive a positive amount of transfer. However, for the households facing posi-
tive income shocks, they may have the attempt to renege from the network to
avoid a current-period income loss. Suppose a household will face expected
utility EU0 starting from the next period onwards if he renege the risk shar-
ing arrangement. In the repeated games, the household incorporate current
period utility and the expected future utility in decision making process.
The optimal transfer in the network would equalize the income among
all agents. Thus, households who are lucky enough to earn y+ have to pay
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for a negative amount of transfer si. Suppose such a household refuses to
pay for the transfer and choose to renege such arrangement, then it will face
expected utility EU0 starting from the next period onwards.
The discounted expected utility over the infinite horizon of reneging
household from current period onwards at discount rate R, when the proba-
bility of N households experience negative income shock is p¯ is given by.
EV˜N = U(y+) +
∞
∑
t=1
(
1
1+ R
)tEU0
= y+ − r
2
y+2 +
∞
∑
t=1
(
1
1+ R
)t[y¯− r
2
(σ2 + y¯2)]
= y+ − r
2
y+2 +
1
R
[y¯− r
2
(σ2 + y¯2)] (2.12)
Assume that throughout all the periods, if no one reneges, a network
always selects the first best level of transfer. Thus the discounted expected
utility over the infinite horizon of non-reneging household at discount rate R
is the baseline utility with post-transfer income y+ + s+ plus the discounted
utility of EUN of each period onwards.
EV′N = U(y
+ + s+) +
∞
∑
t=1
(
1
1+ R
)tEUN
= U(y+ +
n
N
(y+ − y−)) +
∞
∑
t=1
(
1
1+ R
)tEUN
= y+ +
n
N
(y+ − y−)− r
2
(y+ +
n
N
(y+ − y−))2 + 1
R
[y¯− r
2
(
σ2
N
+
N − 1
N
ρσ2 + y¯2)]
The risk sharing contract will be self-enforcing if and only if the expected
utility of joining the contract is greater than reneging in infinite horizons, that
is EV′N − EV˜N > 0, which is known as the incentive compatibility constraint.
EV′N − EV˜N
=
n
N
(y− − y+)− r
2
[
N − n
N
y+ +
n
N
y−]2 + r
2
y+2 +
r(N − 1)(1− ρ)σ2
2NR
=
n
N
(y+ − y−)[ry+ − nr
2N
(y+ − y−)− 1] + r(N − 1)(1− ρ)σ
2
2NR
> 0 (2.13)
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when n = N − 1, the self-enforcement constraint becomes:
EV′N − EV˜N
=
N − 1
N
(y+ − y−){ r
2
[y+ + y− + 1
N
(y+ − y−)]− 1}+ r(N − 1)(1− ρ)σ2
2NR
> 0
(2.14)
which is always greater than zero if we require the income y to be large
enough. That is, if N − 1 households suffered from a negative income shock,
then the risk sharing arrangement is self-enforcing.
2.1.2 Interpretation
Now let labor sharing be the primary means of income sharing among
the N households because all of them participate in agricultural production.
Suppose that a self-enforcing risk sharing arrangement is in place before a
disaster. The set of characteristics of households included in our model is
{y¯, σ2, ρ, r, N, R} the mean income y¯, which is mainly determined by agricul-
tural productivity; the household income variance σ2, determined by weather
shocks, pests, and other production shocks; risk aversion rate r, time discount
factor R, network size N; income correlation coefficient ρ among households.
Existing literature has explored the impact of earthquake on the above
characteristics. People update their perception of risk after experiencing a
disaster. Most previous studies have claimed that people are more risk averse
if they suffering from a disaster (Cameron and Shah, 2015, Havenaar et al.,
2003, Sacco, Galletto, and Blanzieri, 2003), while some other literature found
that people were not always more risk averse (Li et al., 2011). For time dis-
count factor, Filipski et al., 2015 investigated that the 2008 Sichuan earth-
quake has induced a shift in people’s time preference, where they put greater
preference for the present and "living like there’s no tomorrow". This found-
ing is consistent with the adjusting discount rate for uncertainty in cost-
benefit analysis. Intuitively, income correlation coefficient within a village
ρ would increase if the entire network was impacted by a common shock.
The self-enforcing condition given in (2.15) describes the static relation-
ship of several determinants for such an arrangement to be self-enforcing.
The comparative statics provide more information on how the features of
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household may determine their incentives to participate in the cooperative
arrangement. The partial derivatives of the self-enforcing condition (equa-
tion 2.12) with respect to the discount factor R and the mean income y¯ are
negative, while the partial derivatives with respect to network size N, in-
come variance σ2, risk aversion rate r, and income correlation coefficient ρ
are positive. The comparative statics indicate that an decrease in time dis-
count factor, network size, risk aversion rate, and income correlation coeffi-
cient would reinforce the self-enforcing condition.
∂(EV′N − EV˜N)
∂N
> 0,
∂(EV′N − EV˜N)
∂σ2
> 0 (2.15)
∂(EV′N − EV˜N)
∂ρ
< 0,
∂(EV′N − EV˜N)
∂r
> 0 (2.16)
∂(EV′N − EV˜N)
∂y¯
< 0,
∂(EV′N − EV˜N)
∂R
< 0 (2.17)
A community shock will act on those factors for all the households simul-
taneously, shift their incentives to invest in and maintain the social network,
and and therefore facilitate the performance of informal risk sharing network
in the society.
We will further test the theoretical results using the empirical data from
before and after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Based on the availability of
data and previous literature, we find the proxy for each of those household
characteristics. The estimation of income y¯ and σ2 has played a central role
in agricultural economics. One of the standard approach is to assume the
distribution of income and estimate the parameters based on panel data or
cross-sectional/time serious data including output, price, consumption, and
other relevant information observed by economists (Lin, Dean, and Moore,
1974,Just, Zilberman, and Hochman, 1983). In this paper, we simply control
for the real income and other production-related factors to control income.
The risk aversion of various measures have also been an essential part in
determining dynamic results of behavior under uncertainty in agricultural
economics literature (Bar-Shira, Just, and Zilberman, 1997, Just, Zilberman,
and Hochman, 1983). We simply assume that the representative household
have the same risk aversion rate, and the risk aversion level would increase
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in the post-disaster period (Skidmore and Toya, 2002). For the rest three fea-
tures, income correlation coefficient, time discount factor, and risk aversion
rate, we didn’t control for them due to the constraint of the data. Our strat-
egy is to check whether the empirical result is consistent with the theoretical
prediction. A further discussion is provided in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Labor Sharing
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we provide empirical results of the impact of natural
disaster on labor sharing behavior in the village networks in rural Sichuan,
China. This type of reciprocated labor-sharing arrangement is of paramount
importance in rural developing areas (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003). It often
serves as a substitute for formal contract enforcement for better resource al-
location when the formal labor institutions are missing or imperfect. The
agricultural labor under such arrangements has been given various names,
such as cooperative labor, reciprocal labor, collective labor, exchanged labor,
and communal labor (Erasmus, 1956; Moore, 1975; Takasaki 2011). The no-
tion of such reciprocal exchange in agricultural production are rooted in pre-
capitalist societies, and is still widely existed in many developing areas.
There are several advantages of such labor arrangements. Firstly, it is
one of the primary mechanisms for risk sharing in the rural society(Takasaki
et al., 2014, Gilligan, 2004, Barr, Dekker, and Fafchamps, 2012, Fafchamps
and Lund, 2003). The cooperative labor helps to smooth out the bottleneck
in any seasonal labor shortage, mobilize labor when lacking the cash to hire
extra-family labor, and provide protection against health risk since agricul-
tural operations must be done in a timely fashion (Fafchamps and Lund,
2003, Takasaki et al., 2014). Secondly, cooperative labors perform synchronous
work faster and are thus more productive than family labors (Takasaki et al.,
2014). Through adjustments in labor reciprocity, the labor-sharing arrange-
ments are efficient in increasing production by accomplishment of certain
tasks at a lower cost than hired labor (Abizaid et al., 2015). Besides, the shar-
ing arrangements also play social functions by serving as a source of group
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identify and solidarity (Mitchell, 2006). In conclusion, the households form
an informal network arrangement through reciprocal labor sharing.
3.2 Description of Key Variables
Our research interest is to explore the impact of natural disasters on la-
bor sharing arrangements. Thus our key variables include measurement of
labor sharing, intensity of earthquake, and other household-level or village
level characteristics that are relevant to labor sharing.
3.2.1 Dependent Variable: Measurement of Labor Sharing
Arrangement
The data uses categorical measurement for labor-sharing frequency. Farm-
ers are asked to indicate how often they helped their neighbors and friends
in the farm work during agricultural harvest season. Score 1 indicated never,
2 indicated sometimes, and 3 indicated very often. We collected information
from the year 2007 and 2011, so we have both pre-disaster and post-disaster
information for the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake.
We choose this frequency of labor sharing behavior to describe the per-
formance of the sharing arrangement for three reasons. Firstly, our goal is
to examine the changes in general networking behavior in the presence of a
disaster, instead of focusing on the structure of social pairs (whether it is one
sided or reciprocated, etc.). Secondly, the level of behavior is one of the two
forms of connectedness in the network theory, it is the implicit consequences
of agent’s actions on everyone else in the network (Easley and Kleinberg,
2010). Thirdly, the level of behavior is a straightforward question for net-
work density and is available in our data. While there are many other differ-
ent aspects of network measurement as described in Chapter 1, we believe
the level of reciprocal behavior is most appropriate one in this study.
3.2.2 Explanatory Variables: Earthquake Intensity
Our primary proxy for earthquake intensity is the Modified Mercalli In-
tensity (MMI), which quantifies the observed effects of an earthquake into
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different levels. It is computed using the MMI map from the United States
Geological Survey (USGS) and the geographic information systems software
(GIS). We use this measurement across all specifications, and use distance to
epicenter for robustness check. As shown in Figure 1.2, there are also many
aftershocks scattered near the epicenter which last for almost two years after
the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake, we admit that not having controlled for those
aftershocks in one shortcoming in this study.
3.2.3 Other Control Variables
We reviewed the determinants of sharing and cooperative behaviors in
Chapter 1, and incorporate the relevant features in our theoretical model in
Chapter 2. There are many aspects to consider when people make a decision
to share or to cooperate, including economic situation, time preference, emo-
tion, status concern, etc. Therefore, we control for standard demographic
information, including household size, which is the total number of family
members in a household; a dummy variable for household head gender; ed-
ucation years for household head; a dummy variable for household head’s
party membership; household income ( the ln value of total income in RMB),
and landownership (acre) in all regressions. Besides, we control for.
3.3 Empirical Results: Labor Sharing in the after-
math of 2008 Sichuan Earthquake
3.3.1 General trend
Figure 3.1 plots the average changes in labor sharing behavior in the
sample villages. The twenty one villages out of twenty two samples expe-
rienced significant decrease in labor sharing, as shown in the fitted lowess
curve. Moreover, the reduction was related to the earthquake intensity. Vil-
lages exposed to severe earthquakes tend to show a greater decrease in shar-
ing behavior among the agents.
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FIGURE 3.1: Changes in labor sharing behavior and fitted
lowess curve over time in areas that were affected and in areas
not affected by the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan, China
Notes: The y-axis are the changes in the average frequency of labor-sharing behavior before
and after the earthquake. The frequency was measured by a self-reported scale from 1 to 3
(1 means never, and 3 means very often). The x-axis is the MMI earthquake intensity that
represents different locations. The size of the dot is proportional to the sample size in each
location. The line is the Lowess Curve curve with a bandwidth of 0.6.
3.3.2 Identification
Estimation 1: OLS Model
To test the general trend in Figure 3.1 that the severity of earthquake is
associated with decreased labor sharing behavior, we regress labor sharing
frequency on the interaction of the earthquake intensity and post-disaster
dummy. Our identification strategy is similar to the difference-in-difference
model, except that our treatment was not binary; we used the continuous
measure MMI for earthquake intensity to represent the variation in the treat-
ment. By using panel data, we were able to isolate the exogenous effect of the
earthquake by taking the difference before and after the disaster, and com-
pare the differences across households that experienced different levels of
earthquakes. Our baseline regression is the Linear Ordinary Least Square:
sharingvit = αT
post
t + γIntensityv× T postt + xvitβ+ vvi + lv + εvit (3.1)
The left-hand side variable, sharingvit is the frequency of labor sharing be-
havior for household i in period t. Tpostt is an indicator variable that equals
one for the period after the earthquake, Intensityv is the earthquake intensity
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suffered by household i at village v, xvit is time-varying household charac-
teristics that included the household head’s gender, age, age squared, party
membership, education, household size, and landholdings.
We also include a set of household fixed effect and location fixed ef-
fects in equation (3.1). Household fixed effects vvi control for unobserved
time-invariant household preference for sharing cooperation. Location fixed
effects lv (twenty-two dummies for each village) control for time-invariant
local preference and culture for labor sharing. The term εvit is unobserved
random shocks following normal distributions, which are time varying and
location specific. The coefficient α measures the effect of the earthquake and
other time trends that were common to all the households (for example,
regional changes in agricultural mechanization, labor migration, and other
province-level shock for labor sharing activity ). And γ is our coefficient of
interest that distinguishes the impact of the earthquake (i.e., whether the in-
tensity of the earthquake explains the changes in the left-hand-side in time i
compared to the base year). The results are presented in column (1) of Table
2.
Estimation 2: Ordered Logistic Model
Our variable of interest, the frequency of labor sharing behavior, takes
discrete values 1, 2, and 3. The survey respondents choose those answers on
scale, where 1 indicates "very rare" and 3 indicates "very often". The under-
lying assumption in the OLS regression is that the distance between the three
categories are all equal, which is problematic. Therefore, we use the ordered
logistic model to relax this assumption, the identification thus becomes:
sharing∗vit = αT
post
t + γIntensityv× T postt + xvitβ+ vvi + lv + εvit (3.2)
The left-hand side variable sharing∗vit is the latent variable of frequency of
labor sharing behavior for household i in period t, which is an exact but un-
observed variable. Tpostt , Intensityv, xvit, vvi, and lv are the same with the
baseline OLS regression. The random shock εvit follows a logistic normal
distribution. The coefficients α measures common time trends, and γ is our
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coefficient of interest that distinguishes the impact of the earthquake.
Cvit = k i f κk−1 < sharing∗vit < κk, k = 1, 2, 3 (3.3)
The thresholds for the frequency are strictly increasing, where 3 indi-
cates very frequent labor sharing behavior, while 1 indicates no sharing,
(i.e.κk−1 < κk and κ0 = −∞, κk+1 = +∞). Therefore, the probability of
observing outcome k for household i at time t is given by:
Prob(Cvit = k|κ, xit, vi) = Λ(κk − ρTpostt − γIntensityv × Tpostt − xitβ− vi)
−Λ(κk−1 − ρTpostt − γIntensityv × Tpostt − xitβ− vi) (3.4)
where Λ is the logistic distribution function with the form Λ(u) = (1+
exp(−u)−1). We can assume the time-invariant household heterogeneity vvi
to be random. The results are presented in column (2) and column (3) of
Table 2.
Estimation 3: Fixed effects ordered logit (FE-OL)
The Ordered Logistic Model does not control for unobserved time-invariant
heterogeneity vvi (such as household’s farming habit, etc) in the maximum
likelihood estimation for three reasons. Firstly, only the difference vik =
κk − vi can be identified. Secondly, under fixed time, asymptotic κk − vi is
biased due to identical parameter problem.(Lancaster, 2000) Thirdly, the bias
of estimated coefficients are substantial in short panels (Greene, 2004). Thus
we applied the Fixed-effect Ordered Logistic Model to control for the individual
unobservable heterogeneity.
Therefore, we collapse sharingit to a binary variable and get estimates,
since it is feasible to add fixed-effects to a binary model. Our strategy is
similar to Mukherjee et al., 2008 that estimators rely on conditional logit
estimation of dichotomized ordered responses. We define a variable dit =
I(sharingit > κk) , where I() is the indicator function and k is a cutoff point.
The probability of observing a sequence of outcomes dkit = (d
k
i1, d
k
i2, ...d
k
iT)
conditional on the ones in the sequence is:
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Prob(dkit|
t
∑
1
dkit = vi) =
exp(∑t1 d
k
itxitβ)
∑Ii=Bi exp(∑
t
1 Iitxitβ)
(3.5)
where the βi is the set of all possible outcomes that have same number of
ones as dki . Chamberlain, 1979 showed that maximizing the conditional log
likelihood gave a consistent estimate of β.
Assume error terms εit are i.i.d and follow a logistic distribution, then
the minimum sufficient statistic for vi is ∑t1 C
k
it. Conditioning on this suffi-
cient statistic, we can get a consistent estimate by maximizing the conditional
likelihood function. Therefore, each individual’s contribution to the condi-
tional likelihood would not depend on vi (Chamberlain, 1979).
In an ordered response situation, we can collapse the Cit to a binary
variable and get estimates using the method above. By minimizing the dis-
tance of all those estimates, we are able to get the final estimates, which are
unbiased and consistent, as proved by Chamberlain. (Chamberlain, 1979)
Therefore the most important step is to choose the cutoff points to collapse
the ordered Cit. One suggestion is to use all k − 1 possible cutoff points
(Baetschmann, Staub, and Winkelmann, 2011; Das and Van Soest, 1999 ). Das
and Van Soest, 1999 estimated the coefficient k− 1 times and used the k− 1
different cutoff in each time (known as DvS estimator, Minimum Distance es-
timator, or MD estimator). Baetschmann, Staub, and Winkelmann, 2015 first
enlarged the dataset where each individual was repeated k − 1 times, and
clustered the standard errors by individual (known as Blow-up and cluster,
or BUC estimator). In this paper, we follow the BUC approach. We firstly re-
peat each household’s information twice, therefore each household has two
identical observations. Then we collapse the category data of these two ob-
servations using different criteria. In one observation 1 is treated as 0, 2 and
3 are treated as 1; while in another observation 1 and 2 is treated as 0, and
3 is treated as 1. We run the fixed-effect logistic regression using this new
dataset, and cluster the standard error by households. The results are pre-
sented in column (4) of Table 2.
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3.3.3 Empirical Results
Table 2 summarizes the results from linear regression and logistic re-
gressions. Household characteristics, including household size, household
head gender, household head age, household head education years, party
membership, household income, and landownership, are controlled in all
the specifications. The coefficients of the interaction term, the intensity and
post disaster dummy are significantly negative across all the specifications.
Column (1) reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation results with
natural village fixed effect and household fixed effect. One degree increase in
the earthquake intensity is associated with 0.11 score decrease in labor shar-
ing behavior at 1% significance level.
Column (2) and column (3) report the results from Ordered Logistic re-
gression. Natural village fixed effects are included in (3) to control for village-
specific time-invariant factors that might have influenced sharing behavior,
such as village history, customs, and village growth potential. The coefficient
of the interaction term are both negative and significant, with similar mag-
nitudes. As the magnitude of the coefficients in logistic level are in log-odd
form, and does not have a simple interpretation, we examine the significance
level. Both the coefficients of the interaction term are significantly below
zero, at 1% significant level and 10% significant level.
Column (4) reports the result from Fixed-effect Logistic regression. The
number of household reduced from 1420 to 526, since the households who
did not change the sharing behavior would be eliminated from the fixed-
effect logistic regression. The information loss is huge from this regression,
but the remaining 526 households who adjusted their behaviors under the
shock of an earthquake are of our primary interest. The coefficient is nega-
tive at 5% significance level, and the magnitude is similar to the results from
ordered logistic regression. All regression results indicate that one magni-
tude increase in the earthquake is associated with a lower probability of labor
sharing behavior in the farmwork.
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TABLE 2: Impacts of earthquake on labor sharing behavior from
OLS and Logistic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Linear FE Logistic Logistic Logistic FE
Intensity*year2011 -0.110*** -0.245*** -0.026* -0.284**
(0.018) (0.089) (0.089) (0.140)
year2011 0.656*** 1.175** -0.270 0.663
(0.118) (0.572) (0.544) (0.837)
Constant 1.210***
(0.260)
Observations 2,606 2,606 2,606 1053
Number of id 1,420 1,420 1,420 526
Village FE NO No YES NO
Household FE YES NO NO YES
Notes: The dependent variable is labor sharing frequency in 2007 and in 2011. The
frequency was measured by a self-reported scale from 1 to 3 (1 means never, and 3 means
very often). The controls are village-fixed effects, or/and household fixed-effects, and
household characteristics (household size; household head gender, age, education years,
party membership; household income, and landownership). Robust errors in parentheses,
clustered at the village level. Significance levels are indicated by *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p
< 0.1.
3.3.4 Robustness checks
The correlation between the shock intensity and the reduced labor shar-
ing behavior doesn’t indicate causality. There are multiple potential sources
of endogeneity in our estimation. The primary concern with our independent
variable is the measurement of shock. If the independent variable, earth-
quake intensity is not exogenous, the estimation would be biased. Omitted
variables may also affect the result. Thus we add additional controls for the
labor sharing behavior in the baseline regression, including network size and
local employment status. There are also potential correlated unobservables
that drive the changes in general social interactions. We will use another
reciprocal behavior, gift exchange, as a robustness check.
In this section, we argue that the earthquake intensity is exogenous, and
control for
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Earthquake Intensity
In this paper, we use the Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) as the mea-
surement for the earthquake. The advantage of this measurement has been
discussed in Chapter 1. It quantifies the observed effects of an earthquake
on the Earth’s surface, humans, objects of nature, and man-made structures
on a scale (USGS). However, the the inclusion of experienced damage in this
measurement is our first worry of endogeneity. It might be correlated with
the error term and thus induce estimation bias. We therefore run a robust-
ness check using an alternative measurement for earthquake intensity, the
distance to earthquake epicenter.
The distance to epicenter has been widely used in the evaluation of
earthquake impact (Filipski et al., 2015). It is easy to compute and is a fully
exogenous proxy for damages. The estimation result using this measurement
is shown in table 4, column (4). The impact is very similar to MMI estima-
tion, where people living closer to the epicenter significantly decreased their
labor sharing activities.
The endogeneity could also be caused by the self-selected migration and
people’s previous knowledge about disasters. Such beliefs shift the expec-
tation towards future, and thus bring pre-determined heterogeneity in dif-
ferent areas. To relieve this worry, we examined the earthquake record in
Sichuan area, and found no history of huge earthquake in the past three
decades (USDG). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that people’s belief
about the arrival of future shocks are the same before the 2008 earthquake.
The third potential source of endogeneity is the unobservable geology
and topography in local area. The geographical conditions are not only rel-
evant to earthquake intensity, but also impact the crop diversity, locations
of households, cultivation system, and thus determine the habit of sharing
and cooperation in the farming activities. (Abizaid et al., 2015) To solve this
problem, we firstly conduct a baseline regression to check whether sharing
activities differ across locations before the earthquake happens. The signif-
icant correlation between labor sharing and earthquake intensity indicates
that there’s indeed baseline difference in sharing activity across villages. This
could be caused by geographical conditions, culture, or some other unob-
servable location-specific conditions. Our hypothesis is that geographical
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condition in different areas have parallel time trend, thus we could success-
fully control for unobservable geology and topography using the difference-
in-differences method in our specification. The alternative hypothesis is that
geology and topography have involved differently in the earthquake area
and the non-earthquake areas. For example, the shock may have exerted
different impacts on soft soils v.s solid soils, and thus induce some different
changes in agricultural behavior. In this case, we argue that such changes
are also caused by the earthquake. We admit that an instrumental variable is
desired to support this argument, and this is one of the shortcomings of this
study.
TABLE 3: Robustness Check of Earthquake Intensity and Labor
Sharing Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year Year 2007 Year 2011 Year 2007 Year 2011
MMI -0.0721*** -0.0797***
(0.0130) (0.0127)
ln(distance) 0.232*** 0.236***
(0.0371) (0.0371)
Constant 2.408*** 2.368*** 0.692*** 0.767***
(0.0875) (0.0868) (0.184) (0.185)
R-squared 0.023 0.027 0.027 0.030
Notes: The dependent variable is labor sharing frequency.. The frequency was measured by
a self-reported scale from 1 to 3 (1 means never, and 3 means very often). The independent
variables are different measurement for earthquake intensity, i.e. Modified Mercalli
Intensity, and the ln of distance to earthquake epicenter. Significance levels are indicated by
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Alternative Job Opportunities
The general labor market trend (employment status) and spatially cor-
related location-specific employment shocks impact labor sharing behavior.
The formal labor hiring mechanism, and the availability of non-rural job op-
portunities in local areas reduce the incentive of labor sharing participation
(Faas, 2012). This source of correlation could be partly controlled for by in-
cluding time fixed effects that picks up the common trend in local labor mar-
ket. We first summarize the labor components in the sampled villages, trying
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to describe the general labor structure in the observed periods. Takasaki et al
(2012) shows that family, hired, and cooperative labor are perfect substitutes,
even though the latter two are more productive. Faas, 2012 also points out
that labor employment is negatively associated with participation in labor
groups based on reciprocity (mingas). We thus summarize the household
labor status in Table 3.
TABLE 4: Summary Statistic of Number of Family Labors
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Year = 2007
Intrafamily labor 2.817 1.251 0 9 1,581
Agricultural labor 1.865 1.067 0 9 1,581
Migrant worker 0.663 0.993 0 4 1,581
Year = 2009
Intrafamily labor 2.755 1.336 0 9 1,553
Agricultural labor 1.883 1.128 0 9 1,553
Migrant worker 0.608 1.003 0 5 1,553
Year = 2011
Intrafamily labor 2.762 1.386 0 9 1,530
Agricultural labor 1.750 1.091 0 9 1,530
Migrant worker 0.627 0.982 0 5 1,530
As shown in the table, in the observed period, the number of family
labor (total number, number of agricultural labor, and number of migrant
worker) are stable. Unfortunately, due to the constraint of our data, we could
not present the information of hired labor or cooperative labor due to huge
measurement errors. But the existing evidence about intra-family labors have
shown that family labor supply is seemingly exogenous to the changes in la-
bor sharing, and thus help us to rule out the channel that reduced sharing is
caused by labor shortage due to the mortality or hurt during the disaster. It is
therefore reasonable to assume that the formal/informal labor market struc-
ture, rather than number of available labors, has changed. We further explore
this channel by controlling for formal and informal labor market information
in local areas in the regression.
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TABLE 5: Robustness Check: Employment Status and Labor
Sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables
Intensity*year2011 -0.383*** -0.386*** -0.387** -0.386**
(0.125) (0.127) (0.152) (0.152)
year2011 1.361* 1.365* 1.087 1.073
(0.780) (0.785) (0.983) (0.985)
Village labor price 0.0139 0.0129
(0.0136) (0.0132)
Employment status 0.000317 -0.000129
(0.00138) (0.00151)
Observations 1053 1053 1053 1053
Number of id 526 526 526 526
Village FE NO NO NO NO
Household FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: The dependent variable is labor sharing frequency in 2007 and in 2011. The
frequency was measured by a self-reported scale from 1 to 3 (1 means never, and 3 means
very often). The controls are village-fixed effects, or/and household fixed-effects, and
household characteristics (household size, household head gender, education, party
membership, household income, and landownership). Robust errors in parentheses,
clustered at the village level. Significance levels are indicated by *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p
< 0.1.
The additional control variables include non-farm job employment sta-
tus (proxied by the average number of hired labor in the household besides
i in the village) and hired labor price (proxied by the average village level
wage). We choose these two variables based on the availability of our data.
The regression results are presented in Table 4. The coefficients of the in-
teraction term remain stable, and the coefficient of additional controls is not
significant. We find little evidence that local employment status significantly
affect labor sharing behavior.
Network Size
It has been well addressed that peers exert enormous influence on hu-
man behavior. The peer influence is even more significant in cooperative
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behaviors, where at least two parties have to join the interactions. Jackson
(2010) provides a foundation for understanding the impact of social network
structure on behaviors, which allows us to examine the behavioral changes
where individuals make decisions after information updating or contagion.
In this context, the labor sharing behavior could be characterized as a semi-
anonymous graphical game, where an individual’s choice is mainly influ-
enced by the relative group of people. Therefore, the number of anony-
mous people who participate in labor sharing effect one’s stochastic decision.
People rely on narrow and denser networks within a kin group than wide
cross group networks for stronger reciprocity in labor sharing (Takasaki et
al., 2014), since individuals with larger networks are more likely to receive
support from formal institutions (Faas, 2012).
The previous literature haven shown that network size plays a key role
in reciprocal labor sharing. Therefore, We add network size as an additional
control in the regression. Our proxy for network size is the number of play-
ers in one of the important social entertainment, Majiang game. Majiang (or
mah-jongg) is a four-player pastime popular in Sichuan province and in East
Asia. The 2007 and 2011 surveys asked the frequency that household mem-
bers play Majiang, the number of regular Majiang partners, and the relation-
ship with major partner. We use the number of players in one’s Majiang game
as a proxy for network size. In addition, we also use relationship with Ma-
jiang players as the proxy for social distance with friends. The seven types
of relationships include: 1, close relative; 2, other relative; 3, neighbour; 4,
college; 5, comrade-in-arms; 6, teacher or student; and 7, business partner.
We assume the order corresponds to the order of social distance. The results
are presented in column (1) to (3) of Table 6. The coefficient of the interaction
term remain similar, and the coefficients of network size and social distance
are not significant, indicating that none of these factors impact labor sharing
behaviors.
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TABLE 6: Robustness Check: Network Size
(1) (2) (3)
Variables FE-OL FE-OL FE-OL
Intensity*year2011 -0.383*** -0.376*** -0.378**
(0.125) (0.127) (0.125)
year2011 1.361* 1.307* 1.319
(0.780) (0.786) (0.782)
Network Size (number of Majiang players) 0.591
(0.0150)
Social Distance (with Majiang players) 0.166
(0.989)
Observations 1053 1053 1053
Number of id 526 526 526
Village FE NO NO NO
Household FE YES YES YES
Notes: The dependent variable is labor sharing frequency in 2007 and in 2011. The
frequency was measured by a self-reported scale from 1 to 3 (1 means never, and 3 means
very often). The controls are village-fixed effects, or/and household fixed-effects, and
household characteristics (household size, household head gender, education, party
membership, household income, and landownership). Robust errors in parentheses,
clustered at the village level. Significance levels are indicated by *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p
< 0.1.
Different cut-off points in FE-OL
We also check the robustness of our main identification, the Fixed Ef-
fect Ordered Logistic Model. Other suggestions for the cut-off points involve
using the different cut-offs for each individual that can minimize the indi-
vidual’s Hessian matrix (Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Frijters 2004), or use the indi-
vidual mean or median. The regression results using these different cut-off
points are shown in table 7. The relationship between labor sharing activity
and earthquake intensity are still significant across different cut-off points.
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TABLE 7: Robustness Check, cut-off points in Fixed Effects Or-
dered Logit Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cut-off points 1 1 2 2 mean mean
Intensity*year2011 -0.427*** -0.360** -0.667*** -0.127 -0.323*** -0.226*
(0.123) (0.174) (0.172) (0.232) (0.124) (0.132)
Year2011 2.162*** 1.358 2.835*** -0.391 1.200* 0.797
(0.793) (1.019) (1.069) (1.360) (0.717) (0.769)
Constant 3.024 -8.124** -1.602
(2.297) (3.315) (1.319)
Observations 2,966 346 2,966 212 2,966 508
Number of id 1,689 173 1,689 106 1,689 254
Village FE YES NO YES NO YES NO
Household FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: The dependent variable is labor sharing frequency in 2007 and in 2011. The
frequency was measured by a self-reported scale from 1 to 3 (1 means never, and 3 means
very often). The controls are village-fixed effects, or/and household fixed-effects, and
household characteristics (household size, household head gender, education, party
membership, household income, and landownership). Robust errors in parentheses,
clustered at the village level. Significance levels are indicated by *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p
< 0.1.
3.3.5 Robustness Check 2: Gift exchange
In this section, we present the results of the reciprocated gift-exchange
behavior in the aftermath of the earthquake. The purpose is to examine
the response of informal credit market to community shock as a robustness
check, which is a robustness check for informal labor market.
The economic meaning of gift exchange behavior has been investigated
extensively in the field of economics, psychology, finance, sociology, and an-
thropology. Gift exchanges are a good supplement to formal mechanisms,
such as legal contracts, which allow individuals to trade with each other with
a lower transaction cost (Wilfred and Albert, 2009). Larsen and Watson (2001)
described gifts as an investment between donor and recipient, and gifts with
a greater value contribute to a "more substantial investment". The motives
of donors and recipients could be distinguished as consummatory motives
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and instrumental motives (Portes, 1998). The former refers to a social norm
of sharing, and the latter refers to access to resources that is forced by mu-
tual obligations and trust, and such enforceable rules could be regarded as
an informal contract in rural communities where the credit market is imper-
fect or missing. The motivation is similar to labor sharing behavior, to the
extent that expected self-interested motivation help to form an informal self-
enforcing contract.
In China, presenting gifts at weddings, funerals, birthdays, and other
social events has been a traditional custom for thousands of years. Gift ex-
change is frequently embedded in a network that is formed by kin, political,
or religious relations, and is of great importance in maintaining the relation-
ship (Guanxi) in rural societies. It is has been extensively addressed that
people even sacrifice their basic food consumption or get into debt to afford
the heavy gift spending and to strengthen the social connections. (Chen &
Zhang, 2012a, 2012b; Young & Young, 2007)
General trend
Figure 3.2 describes the gift-giving behavior for households in and out
of the earthquake area in 2007, 2009, and 2011. The gift-giving frequency is
the times per year that the household present a gift to friends or relatives in
their social network. Figure 2 shows that the gift-giving behavior in the non-
earthquake areas was almost double of that in the earthquake areas in the
baseline time. This means that some pre-determined heterogeneities existed
in the two areas and, therefore, the natural experiment might not have been
randomized. Many factors could have contributed to the baseline difference
in people’s gift exchange behavior, for example, (1) village size, in a large
network the social interactions are more than in a small network; (2) trans-
portation conditions and geographical conditions; (3) culture. We would fu-
ture apply village-level fixed-effect to solve this endogeneity problem in the
econometric regression.
Figure 2 presents the village-level average changes of gift-exchange fre-
quency in the observed period. The average social interactions did not change
sharply immediately after the earthquake in 2009, with a parallel time trend
in the two areas. In 2011, gift-giving frequency in the earthquake area dropped
by approximately 16.7%, while the number went up by 8% in the non-earthquake
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area. Figure 3 shows that the average gift expenditure increased from 2007
to 2011, but the increase was even sharper in the non-effected areas.
FIGURE 3.2: Frequency of household gift-giving over time in
areas that were affected and in areas not affected by the 2008
earthquake in Sichuan, China
Regression result
Our main strategy follows the standard difference in differences (DID)
estimation. We examined the changes in reciprocal behaviors in the after-
math of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. The difference between our strategy
and the standard DID estimation is that we used the continuous measure
of the intensity of the treatment (earthquake), and we attempted to capture
more of the variations in the data.
gvit = α+ ρT
post
t + γIntensityv× T postt + xvitβ+ vvi + εvit (3.6)
where the outcome variable gvit refers to the frequency of gift exchange
behaviors for individual i in year t in village v. The variable Tpostt is an indica-
tor variable that equals to one for periods after the earthquake, its coefficient
ρ measures the effect of the earthquake and other time trends that are com-
mon to all the households. Intensityv is the earthquake intensity in village
v. β, the key parameter of interest, captures the impact of earthquake in-
tensity on behavioral changes in terms of gift-exchange and labor sharing.
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The equation also includes fixed effects for individuals and years, vvi and
Tpostt , respectively. The vector xvit includes other household-level character-
istics that might affect the outcome variables, which include household size,
household head gender education, party membership, household income,
and landownership.
TABLE 8: Impacts of earthquake on gift exchange frequency
from OLS
Explained variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intensity*year2009 -0.889*** -1.009*** -0.854*** -0.962***
(0.147) (0.149) (0.147) (0.148)
Intensity*year2011 -0.347*** -0.407*** -0.250* -0.267**
(0.131) (0.133) (0.135) (0.135)
Year 2009 dummy 6.200*** 6.880*** 5.945*** 6.558***
(0.948) (0.961) (0.951) (0.956)
Year 2011 dummy 1.980** 2.361*** 1.243 1.328
(0.886) (0.898) (0.903) (0.906)
Observations 3,674 3,674 3,312 3,312
R-squared 0.030 0.034
Number of id 1,394 1,394 1,155 1,155
Village FE YES NO YES NO
Household FE NO YES NO YES
Notes: The dependent variable is times of presenting a gift per year. The controls are
village-fixed effects, or/and household fixed-effects, and household characteristics
(household size, household head gender, education, party membership, household income,
and landownership).Robust errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.
Significance levels are indicated by *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
We continue to control for income, recovery resources, income inequal-
ity to rule out alternative explanations. Table 3 summarizes the results. The
recovery resources from various sources (government, private firms, and
NGOs) in the aftermath of earthquake could be one of the alternative impact
pathways that impact gift exchange frequency. The estimates coefficients on
recovery resources is significant and negative, implying that households that
received more alternative sources exhibited less willingness to send gifts.
Column (2) through column (4) in Table 3 further control for mortality rate
during the earthquake. The results are significantly negative. Losing a family
member could prompt depression, which contributes to less social activities.
Moreover, losing a child may lower the optimal long-term investment, which
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leads to less social gift-giving as social investment. Column (3) through col-
umn (4) control for income inequality (measured by Gini index), which has
been discussed as one reason for booming social spending (Chen & Zhang,
2012b). The significant result shows that income disparity accounts for social
exchanges.
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TABLE 9: Robustness checks of impacts of earthquake on gift
exchange frequency from OLS
Explained variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intensity*year2009 -0.873*** -0.977*** -0.929*** -0.094
(0.133) (0.146) (0.148) (0.151)
Intensity*year2011 -0.373*** -0.366*** -0.224 -0.052
(0.129) (0.129) (0.146) (0.140)
Year 2009 dummy 6.156*** 6.683*** 6.542*** 0.339
(0.888) (0.938) (0.941) (0.983)
Year 2011 dummy 2.105** 2.098** 1.492 0.338
(0.867) (0.867) (0.919) (0.878)
Recovery resources -0.012** -0.011** -0.013*** -0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Mortality -0.077* -0.088** -0.044
(0.044) (0.045) (0.043)
Number of social events
Income Inequality -3.516** -0.174
(Gini index) (1.518) (1.461)
Peer effect 1.091***
(0.071)
Observations 3,674 3,674 3,674 3,674 3,674
R-squared 0.030 0.030 0.034 0.034
Number of id 1,394 1,394 1,394 1,394
Village FE NO NO NO NO
Household FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: The dependent variable is times of presenting a gift per year. The controls are
village-fixed effects, or/and household fixed-effects, and household characteristics
(household size, household head gender, education, party membership, household income,
and landownership). Robust errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.
Significance levels are indicated by *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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3.3.6 Conclusion
In Section 3.3.3, we examined two potential channels for the reduced
labor sharing behavior as proposed by our model. The result shows that net-
work size and alternative income have little impact on labor sharing. There-
fore, we turn to the other channels proposed in the model, they are, risk aver-
sion rate, income correlation coefficient, and time discount factor. Firstly, it
is widely recognized that people become more risk aversion in the aftermath
of a natural disaster (De Weerdt, 2002,Skidmore and Toya, 2002). Our model
proposed that the self-enforcing condition would be re-enforced if people
are more risk averse. The inconsistency indicated that risk aversion rate is
not the potential channel. Secondly, using the similar argument, we con-
cluded that income correlation coefficient is not the channel, since an earth-
quake should have increased the correlation coefficient and thus improved
the self-enforcing condition. But the empirical regression provides opposite
result. Thirdly, people’s beliefs towards the future is found to be the poten-
tial mechanism. Our first hypothesis is that the earthquake shifted people’s
discount factor and put more weight on the present. As a result, the self-
enforcing condition of labor sharing arrangement bread down. This hypoth-
esis is consistent with the result in Filipski et al.,(2015), where based on the
same dataset they found that the 2008 Sichuan earthquake induced people’s
time preference characterized by a carpe diem attitude toward spending.
3.4 Summary
This paper examines whether the social network as an informal risk-
sharing contract is self-enforcing and the determinants of self-enforcing con-
dition before and after a shock. We firstly presented a theoretical framework
to analyze how networks operate, and included six features in the model
as the determinants for self-enforcing condition. The results show that the
society has not reached the efficient coordination level because many indi-
viduals refuse to enter the risk sharing network in the post-disaster period.
We also provide empirical evidence using a three-year panel data collected in
rural Sichuan, China from both before and after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake.
The econometric results indicate that people are less willing to invest in and
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maintain the social network if they suffered heavily from the earthquake.
The potential mechanism is that people’s time preference changed in the af-
termath of a disaster where they they put less weight on the future. While
the other features, network size, income, income correlation coefficient, and
risk aversion rate are insignificant or contradict to our theoretical hypothesis.
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